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Human rights in the transition to a “green economy” – critical human rights-based approaches 
to climate change in Norway 
 
Abstract: Norwegian climate policy has stalled; it is fundamentally isolated from broader 
energy and economic policies, particularly the country’s petroleum industry. Human rights 
can reinvigorate climate politics by recognising direct threats to global rights from climate 
change, and indirect threats from existing climate policy to workers and communities 
dependent on carbon-intensive development and jobs. A critical, structure-orientated human 
rights approach can overcome ‘problem-solving’, legalistic approaches and hegemonic “green 
economy” narratives, offering an analytical framework that highlights the (largely North-
South) “climate justice” claims behind the climate crisis, and a basis for action for social 
movements to demand rapid transitions that address these justice issues while securing human 
rights. This article develops a framework for Norway’s human rights obligations based on 
recognition of the right to equal ecological space for the fulfillment of all human rights (and 
consequent “ecological debt”) and the insights of institutional human rights theories, before 
outlining a human rights-based approach, based on human rights-based approaches to 
development (HRBAs) and illustrated through the right to work, that fulfils these duties. After 
analysing Norwegian climate discourses in light of this framework, the article tentatively 
outlines how this approach can provide a basis for action for social movements in Norway.  
 





Norwegian climate policy has stalled. Preliminary 2013 figures show greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions at 52.8 megatonnes (Mt) CO2 equivalent; barring a dip during the early 1990s, 
emissions have been over 50Mt since 1990.2 Meanwhile, Norway’s ‘overseas carbon 
                                                 
1 Author information deleted.   
2 Statistisk sentralbyrå (SSB), ‘Utslipp av klimagasser, 2013, foreløpige tall’ (SSB 2014) 
<http://www.ssb.no/klimagassn> accessed 5 June 2014 
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footprint’ from ever-increasing imports has, by some estimates, eclipsed domestic emissions 
during the same period.3  
Recent climate initiatives do not look likely to buck these trends. 2012’s governmental 
white paper (klimamelding) and its attendant parliamentary agreement largely extended 
existing initiatives, such as heightening energy efficiency requirements in (new) buildings, 
raising the carbon tax, continuing support to carbon capture and storage (CCS), and increasing 
(often conditioned on other states following Norway’s lead) development support to energy 
and forestry projects. The most notable original proposal was a new fund (klimafond), set to 
reach NOK 50bn (USD 8.3bn) by 2016, to assist industrial transitions through technological 
development, renewables and energy restructuring, financed through investment returns and 
sales of “electrical certificates” (elsertifikater), a scheme with Sweden to generate 26.4 
terawatt hours (TWh) of new renewable production across the countries by 20204 (a 10 
percent increase in Norwegian electricity production).5 Even so, much of klimamelding has 
already unraveled, most spectacularly CCS – following years of increasing costs and delays, 
the flagship CCS Mongstad test centre, described by former Prime Minister Stoltenberg as 
Norway’s ‘moon-landing’, has been abandoned.6  Klimameldingen’s implementation (for 
example, regarding energy efficiency targets)7 has also been criticised.  
Klimameldingen joined existing emissions reductions goals targeting 30 percent 
emissions reductions on 1990 levels by 2020, increasing to 40 percent ‘if it can contribute 
to… an ambitious climate agreement’ where ‘major’ emitters accept ‘concrete’ obligations; 
‘carbon neutrality’ by 2030 (ensuring ‘emissions reductions corresponding to Norwegian 
emissions in 2030’, thus anticipating reductions overseas)8 if multilateral agreement is 
reached where ‘other industrialised states’ accept ‘significant reductions’; and carbon 
neutrality by 2050 regardless of multilateral agreements. Two-thirds of the 2020 reductions 
are said to be intended domestically. However, this “two-thirds” commitment (cutting 15-
17Mt CO2) was calculated using a business-as-usual scenario (59Mt) in 2020, not 1990 levels 
                                                 
3 John Hille, Framtiden i våre henders klimamelding: Hvordan redusere utslippene i Norge med 30 til 40 
prosent innen 2020 (Framtiden i våre hender 2012), 59 
4 Miljøverndepartementet, Meld. St. 21 (2011–2012): Norsk klimapolitik (klimamelding) (Fagbokforlaget 2012), 
11-15 
5 Kari Elisabeth Kaski; Tale Severina Halsør; Frikk Hugo Bø Nesje; and Marius Gjerset, En Grønn Industri Er 
Norges Fremtid: Virkemidler For Klimatiltak i Industrien (Zero 2011), 51   
6 Bellona, ‘Mongstad CCS demonstration plant wrecked by incompetence and big oil shenanigans’ (Bellona 
2013) <http://www.bellona.org/articles/articles_2013/Mongstad_fails> accessed 19 September 2013 
7 Magnus Borgen, ‘Regjeringen med utspekulert brudd på klimaforliket’ (Bellona 2013) 
<http://www.bellona.no/nyheter/Nyheter%202013/Regjeringen%20med%20utspekulert%20brudd%20pa%20kli
maforliket> accessed 19 September 2013 
8 Miljøverndepartementet (n 4 above) 9  
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(50Mt) as the goal itself. Cutting 15-17Mt from 59Mt gives 42-44Mt (12-16 percent cuts on 
1990 levels), meaning the rest of the 30 percent cut can occur elsewhere.9 
Fundamentally, Norwegian climate policy is isolated from broader questions of energy 
and economic policy. A 2011 petroleum white paper charted a long-term plan for reserve 
growth of 800 million standard cubic meters (sm³) oil equivalent by 2015 alone.10 Petroleum 
spending dwarfs climate spending, evening when accounting for part-state owned enterprises 
like Statkraft (Europe’s largest renewable energy producer, mainly hydropower)11 and Enova 
(which has invested NOK 9bn delivering 16.6TWh in renewables or energy efficiency 
between 2002 and 2011).12 The 2013 budget included NOK 28.32bn for state direct petroleum 
concerns alone,13 while over NOK 1.3 trillion is invested in petroleum through (largely state-
owned) Statoil.14  The conspiracy of silence around the country’s petroleum industry and its 
contribution to climate change extends to the government elected  in 2013, which, while 
protecting the sensitive areas of Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja from oil exploration during the 
next parliament, has committed to a ‘predictable and high tempo’ of allocating new areas for 
petroleum activity15 – despite an unprecedented alliance of over 100 organisations, Klimavalg 
2013, putting climate change and petroleum on the electoral agenda. The new government 
was said to be in a ‘climate policy no man’s land’ on the eve of the 2014 budget;16 and, 
despite opposition parties appearing to force the minority coalition to supply new oil 
installations at Utsira with (non-fossil fuel) electricity from land,17 the government shows no 
sign of slowing the general extraction tempo, allowing Statoil to plough ahead with 
controversial boring on the Arctic periphery.18 According to Framtiden i våre hender (Fivh), 
                                                 
9 Naturvernforbundet, ‘Alt om klimameldingen og klimaforliket’ (Naturvernforbundet 2013) 
<http://naturvernforbundet.no/klima/norsk_klimapolitikk/alt-om-klimameldingen-og-klimaforliket-article26633-
131.html> accessed 19 September 2013 
10 Olje- og energidepartementet (OED), Facts 2012: the Norwegian Petroleum Sector (OED 2012), 38 
11 Pöyry Management Consulting (Pöyry). Grønn Økonomi i Norge: Hva Er Det og Hvordan Få Det Til? Oslo 
(WWF-Norge and Yrkesorganisasjonenes Sentralforbund, YS), 2012, 7 
12 Enova, ‘Resultatrapport 201’2 (Enova 2012) <http://www.enova.no/innsikt/rapporter/resultatrapport-
2012/resultatrapport-2012/561/1319/> accessed 19 September 2013 
13 Finansdepartementet, Statsbudsjettet, (Fagbokforlaget 2013), 48 
14 Marius Holm, Det bør helst går til helvete (e24.no 2013) <http://e24.no/kommentarer/spaltister/det-boer-helst-
gaa-til-helvete/20348445 accessed> 19 September 2013 
15 Høyre and Fremskritsspartiet, ‘Politisk plattform for en regjering utgått av Høyre og Fremskrittspartiet’ 
(Høyre, 2013) <http://www.hoyre.no/filestore/Filer/Politikkdokumenter/plattform.pdf> accessed 13 November 
2013, 63 
16 Kari Elisabeth Kaski, Klimapolitisk ingenmannsland, NRK, March 12 2014 
17 Dagens Næringsliv (DN), Enige om elektrifisering av Utsira (DN, 2014) 
<http://www.dn.no/nyheter/energi/2014/06/04/Utsirahyden/enige-om-elektrifisering-av-utsira> accessed 5 June 
2014   
18 Greenpeace Norway, ‘Skuffet over at ministeren ofrer Bjørnøya, fortsetter protestene’ (Greenpeace 2014) 
<http://www.greenpeace.org/norway/no/Skuffet-over-at-ministeren-ofrer-Bjornoya-fortsetter-protestene> 
accessed 5 June 2014 
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burning remaining reserves would release emissions 331 times current annual domestic 
emissions,19. 
The direct global effects of this business-as-usual thinking on the entire catalogue of 
human rights, especially basic subsistence rights of the already marginalised and vulnerable, 
particularly in the South, are becoming ever clearer.20 Simultaneously, climate change has 
indirect human rights consequences through our reactions to the crisis. Fears of these effects 
on welfare, jobs and livelihoods can be an ‘obstacle to structural change’ towards sustainable 
societies – particularly in Northern states that have enriched themselves through carbon-
intensive development that is closely linked to rights enjoyment, where marginalised groups, 
workers and communities, often excluded from political processes, are understandably 
wary.21 This is seen in Norwegian climate discourses, where unilateral climate policy is seen 
to cause job losses through ‘carbon leakage’ (discussed later) and new petroleum projects are 
still directly linked to significant job creation. Indeed, this overlooks the fact that the right to 
work link to fossil fuel jobs, and the human rights that depend on this employment, is insecure 
long-term, regardless of climate change, given resource depletion. An explicit human rights 
approach that addresses these issues can breathe new life into Norwegian and international 
climate policy, where UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
negotiations have equally halted, and must do so in order to retain human rights’ assumed 
status ‘as the dominant language of justice’.22 Nevertheless, human rights remain marginal in 
climate discourses, especially those addressing broader economic facets of the climate crisis, 
including debates around transitions to “green economies” and “sustainable development”. 
Likewise, critical economic approaches, like environmental justice perspectives, are 
peripheral, with neoliberal conceptions dominating. Meanwhile, concepts raised in counter-
hegemonic discourses, like “climate justice” and “just transition”, are clearly rights-relevant, 
often using rights language (with a particular focus on the right to work),23 but the features 
                                                 
19 John Hille, ‘Klimabombe under havbunnen’ (Framtiden i våre hender 2011) 
<http://www.framtiden.no/images/stories/tema/klima/A201104_Klimabombe_under_havbunnen.pdf> accessed 
19 September 2013, 1    
20 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), ‘Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and 
Vulnerability’ (IPCC 2014) <http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg2/> accessed 5 June 2014 
21 Martin Jänicke, ‘Industrial Transformation Between Ecological Modernisation and Structural Change’ in 
Martin Jänicke et al (eds), Governance for Industrial Transformation. Berlin (Environmental Policy Research 
Centre 2004), 201-207 
22 Stephen Humphreys, ‘Competing Claims: Human Rights and Climate Harms’ in Stephen Humphreys (ed), 
Human Rights and Climate Change (Cambridge University Press 2010), 45 
23 Public Health and Labor Institutes, ‘A Just Transition for Jobs and the Environment’ (Public Health and 
Labor Institutes 2000) 
<http://www.niehs.nih.gov/health/assets/docs_a_e/a_just_transition_for_jobs_and_the_environment.pdf> 
accessed 13 May 2013 
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they share with human rights are rarely examined. Ultimately, whether human rights can 
remain relevant in assisting transitions to low-carbon societies is in question. 
This article seeks to illustrate a human rights based approach to climate change in 
Norway based on neo-Gramscian critical theory, which offers two main insights. Firstly, it 
distinguishes between ‘problem-solving’ and ‘critical’ theory’. Problem-solving theory ‘takes 
the world’ – its social relations and institutions – ‘as it finds it’, addressing issues within 
existing disciplinary boundaries. As Cox suggests, such positivism is not ‘value-free’ as these 
parameters are themselves ‘value-bound’; thus, often unconsciously, we accept historical, 
normative assumptions built into existing ideas and institutions that acquire hegemonic 
‘commonsense status’. Issues become ‘sources of trouble’ to be resolved using paradigmatic 
disciplinary assumptions aimed at making existing systems ‘work smoothly’. Contrastingly, 
critical theory ‘stands apart from the prevailing order’, asking ‘how that order came about’. 
Importantly, ‘because it deals with a changing reality’, critical theory ‘continually adjust[s]’ 
to shifting social relations, rather than projecting itself as ahistorical. Secondly, and following 
on from these distinctions, given critical theory recognises all theory is normative (explicitly 
or implicitly), it deliberately highlights counter-hegemonic discourses challenging the 
‘prevailing order by seeking out, analysing, and … assisting social processes’ for 
‘emancipatory change’ through examining interactions between social forces, ideas and 
institutions.24 Crucially, as critical theory acknowledges that even critical ideas can become 
problem-solving when fixed into ‘static’, ‘ahistorical’ systems,25 concepts like human rights, 
green economy and climate justice themselves require an ‘immanent critique … to expose 
contradictions and tensions between ideas and practices’ providing opportunities for social 
change.26 Thus, critical theory is concerned with how social actors and movements promote, 
or oppose, emancipatory change.   
Just as Norwegian climate discourses can be described as problem-solving – as both 
policy and civil society often focus on compartmentalised issues without considering the 
fundamental, underlying social relations and institutions upholding the country’s petroleum 
dependency and carbon-intensive economy – so have some human rights approaches, 
particularly legalistic approaches, fallen into the same trap. While legal strategies may assist 
in highlighting serious violations, tackling climate change’s systemic economic drivers 
                                                 
24 Robert W. Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations’ (1981) 10 
Millennium Journal of International Studies 126, 128-130 
25 Ibid. 133 
26 Chamsy el-Ojeili and Patrick Hayden, Critical Theories of Globalization (Palgrave Macmillan 2006), 7 
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through the international human rights system has been difficult. Legalistic approaches are 
hampered by international relations’ statecentricism, failing to capture transnational capital’s 
powerful social forces or offer relief, given states most affected are those with least 
responsibility, or capacity, to respond.27 ‘Actor-orientated’ (as opposed to ‘structure-
orientated’)28 judicial strictures make attribution difficult (because it is ‘virtually impossible 
to disentangle … complex causal relationships’ linking specific emissions to specific 
events),29 usually only grant relief after violations, and overlook structural violence and 
power relations governing access to legal arenas. Furthermore, given the secondary status of 
economic, social and cultural rights (ESCRs) in the evolution of the human rights system, 
their resulting sparse jurisprudence, and the difficulty of capturing socioeconomic processes 
in actor-orientated mechanisms, legal approaches provide inadequate redress for the most 
directly climate-related rights.30 
The problem-solving ‘legal reflex’31 within human rights creates external perceptions 
of human rights as purely legal instruments, restricting human rights’ role in climate politics. 
This reflex encourages formalism – a ‘depoliticisation’ where rights are fixed in static 
systems, becoming ‘ends in themselves’, not ‘means towards … substantive justice’. Once 
‘subaltern’ rights to sovereignty over natural resources and development have thus become 
justifications for conceiving of carbon reserves as ‘sovereign property’, rather than 
commons.32 Furthermore, in treating climate change as a “problem” for human rights as a 
system or discipline, such approaches open to its “resolution” through ruling it out as a 
human rights issue altogether in order to ensure the continued smooth maintenance of the 
system and disciplines, rather than forcing a rethink of their fundamental assumptions. For 
example, defining climate change as an “emergency” (echoing arguments that human rights 
are a ‘brake on … the greater good’ of avoiding climate catastrophe) opens for use of treaties’ 
derogation clauses to suspend certain rights.33  
                                                 
27 Humphreys (n 21 above) 53-55 
28 Johan Galtung, Human Rights in Another Key (Polity Press 1994), 49  
29 Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). ‘Report of the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the relationship between climate change and human rights’ 
(2009) UN Doc A/HRC/10/61, 23 
30 Stephen Humphreys, ‘Introduction: Human Rights and Climate Change’ in Stephen Humphreys (ed), Human 
Rights and Climate Change (Cambridge University Press 2010), 4-5 
31 Paul Gready and Jonathan Ensor, ‘Introduction’ in Paul Gready and Jonathan Ensor (eds), Reinventing 
Development? Translating Rights-Based Approaches from Theory into Practice (Zed Books 2005), 9-10 
32 S. Adelman, ‘Rethinking human rights: the impact of climate change on the dominant discourse’ in Stephen 
Humphreys (ed), Human Rights and Climate Change (Cambridge University Press 2010),177-179 
33 Humphreys (n 21 above) 44-45 
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As problem-solving approaches do not question frameworks within which they 
operate, they assume the continuation of basic tenets of the existing socioeconomic order – 
the system driving climate change – while overlooking social forces that must spark 
transitions. Therefore, more critical human rights approaches are required. While various such 
approaches have been mooted, these are yet to be combined; similarly, existing approaches, 
including human rights-based approaches to development (HRBADs), are yet to be applied 
systematically to the climate crisis. Generally, human rights approaches are said to offer both 
an ‘analytical framework’ and a ‘basis for action’34 to political processes, and they can do the 
same vis-à-vis climate change. This article will outline such an analytical framework for 
Norway’s climate-related human rights obligations, before suggesting a human rights 
approach that fulfils these duties. After analysing Norwegian climate discourses in light of 
this, I will tentatively outline how this approach can provide a basis for action for social 
movements in Norway.  
 
2. A framework for Norway’s climate-related human rights obligations 
 
More critical, structural approaches are often inspired by Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights Article 28 (‘everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights 
and freedoms … in this Declaration can be fully realized’).35 They recognise human rights are 
not exclusively legal but a ‘global practice … both discursive and political’.36 
Conceptualising rights within socio-political processes recognises their ‘generative’ status, 
constantly being constructed and re-constructed through collective struggle. Rights have a 
‘social change function’, and continuously demand new duties and duty-bearers.37 
Critical approaches reveal the normative issues behind the impasse in international 
climate politics. Human rights recognise the climate crisis as a societal crisis, highlighting 
various justice claims and offering social frames to those seeking to address them, taking 
climate change out of the problem-solving constraints of “climate policy”, and tackling the 
ecological crisis’s socioeconomic drivers more holistically. This is vital as the environmental 
movements’ traditional frames, including the very term “environment”, suggest ecological 
                                                 
34 Simon Nicholson and Daniel Chong, ‘Jumping on the Human Rights Bandwagon: How Rights-based Linkages 
Can Refocus Climate Politics’ (2011) 11 Global Environmental Politics 121, 123 
35 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Paris. 10 December 1948 
36 Charles R. Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2009), 8 
37 Gready and Ensor (n 29 above) 10-12 
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issues exist outside of the social realm,38 which is based on the self-destructive ‘metabolic 
rift’ between society and nature described as capitalism’s ‘second contradiction’, through 
which capitalism ultimately undermines its own (natural) conditions of production.39 Critical 
human rights analysis thus draws attention to the discriminatory and iniquitous dimensions of 
the ecological crisis. This essentially projects the conclusion of environmental justice 
advocates, who have documented national ‘environmental discrimination’ against minority 
groups, onto a global scale; the ecological crisis is fundamentally about the expropriation of 
resources from one group (the South) by another (the North), the exploitation of these 
resources and the groups from which they are taken, and the exposure of these groups to the 
ecological damages (“externalities”), especially climatic changes, that result from this 
exploitation.40 Social and environmental injustices are inextricably linked in capitalism’s 
‘treadmill of production’. Given the ecological crisis’s scale today, this treadmill threatens all 
classes, not just the lowest, necessitating ‘industries of denial’ to obscure these justice issues 
and protect those currently benefitting, at least short-term.41 This denialism, coupled with the 
use of environmental frames, means climate policy is often experienced an attack from the 
outside. The sacrifice narrative this creates perpetuates the idea that prosperity cannot be 
achieved or sustained under environmental policy; that environmental policies are “job-
killers” that threaten to take us back to pre-modern societies.  
A human rights-based analysis of the discriminatory nature of the climate crisis can 
give a clearer outline of the components of climate justice. Humphreys outlines four justice 
issues. Firstly, systems and groups responsible for climate change, largely from the North, 
damage the rights of a larger, more vulnerable group, largely in the South (‘corrective 
justice’); simultaneously, those responsible have based their human rights enjoyment on 
carbon-intensive development that is no longer possible for the most vulnerable group 
(‘substantive justice’); given distributive effects, matters of participation arise (‘procedural 
justice’); and there are considerations towards those responsible, who built their prosperity 
without knowing of climate change (‘formal justice’).42 While the latter is often used in 
                                                 
38 V. Johnson, A. Simms, P. Walker and J. Ryan-Collins, Bridging the gap between climate change, resource 
scarcity and social justice: The future role of civil society associations (New Economics Foundation and 
Carnegie UK Trust 2010), 29  
39 Joel Kovel, The Enemy of Nature (Zed Books 2007), 199-232 
40 Wolfgang Sachs, Environment and Human Rights (Wuppertal Paper No. 137., 2003) 
<http://www.wupperinst.org/globalisierung/pdf_global/human_rights.pdf> accessed 30 December 2013 
2013 8-9 
41 David Naguib Pellow and Robert J. Brulle, ‘Introduction’ in David Naguib Pellow and Robert J. Brulle (eds), 
Power, Justice, and the Environment: Toward Critical Environmental Justice Studies (MIT Press 2005), 4-5 
42 Humphreys (n 21 above) 40-42  
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formal legal argumentation around property rights, an analysis based on the non-
discrimination principle and the procedural justice perspective focuses attention more towards 
marginal groups, workers and local communities in Northern societies dependent on carbon-
intensive industries, for whom distributional impacts are likeliest to be ignored in climate 
policy responses. Climate approaches that ignore these justice claims are likely to worsen 
them, and consequently climate change.  
 Several ways to address these theoretical insights have been suggested. Various 
“enabling rights” (umbrella rights that precede and underpin all others) have been proposed to 
set overarching equitable conditions and limits for human rights enjoyment in light of 
environmental concerns. These often come in the form of a right to the environment, or 
climate-specific rights, such as rights to “subsistence emissions”. However, I prefer 
Hayward’s right to equal ‘ecological space’ in which all other rights must be achieved, as it 
avoids fixation on climate change to the detriment of other aspects of the ecological crisis (as 
‘it is the benefits [of emissions], not the emissions’ that matter), and directly addresses the 
ecology-society rift. Under this, no one can take more than their sustainable share of global 
ecological capacity without incurring ‘ecological debt’ (as the North has done historically), 
which obliges a rapid transition to realign with ecological limits, and reparations in the form 
of wealth and technology transfers. Ecological space thus recognises the links between all 
natural resources and human flourishing43 by setting ecological limits (encompassing limits 
on GHG emissions) to human rights. This effectively offers a human rights-based definition 
of sustainable development, or a green economy – a socioeconomic system in which one 
enjoys their human rights within an amount of ecological space that, if generalised, could be 
enjoyed by all without compromising future generations’ rights. This disaggregated, 
ecological definition subverts hegemonic neo-liberal green economy formulations, eschewing 
aggregate measures of development such as economic growth. Growth is, ultimately, only a 
(flawed) proxy for human rights enjoyment (indeed, after certain levels of material wealth, 
many human rights proxies have no correlation with wealth), and is incompatible with 
ecological limits (given ‘immaterial growth’ is empirically and theoretically dubious).44 
Human rights standards, not aggregate proxies, should therefore measure social progress. 
Furthermore, commoditising “ecological services” is equally methodologically and 
                                                 
43 Tim Hayward, ‘Human Rights versus Emissions Rights: Climate Justice and the Equitable Distribution of 
Ecological Space’ (2011) 21 Ethics and International Affairs 431, 442-443 
44 Thomas Coutrot and Jean Gadrey, ‘“Green growth” is called into question’ (2012) 3 European Trade Union 
Institute (ETUI) Policy Brief, 2-4 
Annotated version received: 12.06.14 
normatively dubious given their necessity to survival, wrongly assumes ‘substitutability’ of 
ecosystems through trading and effectively integrates ecology into markets, removing 
participatory influences on environmental decision-making and strengthening hegemonic social 
forces.45 By linking ecological processes and human survival, this human rights-based definition 
also rejects the commoditisation of nature and the inequities that result in allowing one’s position 
in market relations to dictate access to resources necessary to survival.   
After this recognition of the basic ecological envelope in which rights must be 
achieved, specific climate-related human rights duties can be developed using variants of 
Pogge’s ‘institutional’ cosmopolitanism. This sees human rights as ‘primarily ... claims on 
coercive social institutions and secondarily ... claims against those who uphold such 
institutions’. Since human rights are moral claims on societal organisation, societies must be 
‘(re)organized’ so all members enjoy ‘secure access’ to rights. ‘Members’ include those in 
other societies affected by seemingly-domestic social structures (like those in the South pulled 
into the North’s production treadmill), and future generations inevitably influenced by present 
considerations.46 For Pogge, the overriding duty is not to directly supply the object of a right, 
but ‘not to cooperate in upholding’, and work to reform, systems that hinder others from 
fulfilling their own rights.47 Pogge’s approach parallels Shue’s definition of human rights as 
‘rationally justified demand[s] for social guarantees against standard threats’, necessitating a 
universal duty ‘to make and keep effective arrangements’ enabling people’s access to rights.48  
Vis-à-vis climate change, carbon-intensive development consists of numerous 
“coercive institutions” and the actors upholding these. Crucially, conceptualising secure 
access to rights opens to recognising that human rights in carbon-intensive societies, though 
stable short-term, are insecure longer-term given climate change and non-renewable resource 
depletion. Bell has developed the institutional approach into an overarching climate-related 
obligation to promote effective institutions for protecting basic human rights against climate 
threats; climate change violates rights given ‘collective failure to fulfil’ this. This obligation 
implies a ‘general duty’ to ‘promote and maintain effective institutions that … “specify and 
allocate” the more specific duties needed to’ protect basic human rights on the basis of 
climate justice principles. However, to prevent actors arguing that they fulfil this simply 
                                                 
45 Joanna Boehnert, Re-Imaging the Commons as ‘The Green Economy’ (EcoLabs and the Cooperative Institute 
for Research in Environmental Sciences, CIRES, 2013) <http://www.academia.edu/3294072/Re-
Imaging_the_Commons_as_The_Green_Economy> accessed 13 May 2013, 8-13 
46 Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (Polity Press 2002), 37-38  
47 Ibid. 72-75 
48 Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton University Press 1996), 
16-17 
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through negotiations, the general duty also encompasses a ‘duty of rectification’ where 
‘previous non-compliers … accept more burdensome duties’ than ‘if they had always 
complied with the general duty’, as well as a duty ‘not to accept benefits ... from the failure of 
other[s] … to comply with the general duty’, for example through stalling negotiations. Thus, 
previous non-compliers (namely, the North) must reduce emissions immediately and follow 
emissions targets when the general duty is fulfilled.49 This means existing human rights insist 
on climate action, regardless of other climate agreements. 
Norway contributes to carbon-intensive development globally as one of the world’s 
largest net oil and gas exporters50 and through carbon-intensive domestic development.51 The 
former is excluded from national greenhouse gas (GHG) inventories because emissions occur 
in other countries – an accounting practice incompatible with the institutional approach.  
Furthermore, much of the latter is overlooked given the aforementioned ‘overseas carbon 
footprint’ from import-based consumerism.52  
Norwegian human rights are thus currently premised on carbon-intensive development 
(and, generally, a growing ecological footprint, implying ecological debt).53 Eight percent of 
Norwegians work directly or indirectly in petroleum jobs, with the industry comprising 
around a quarter of GNP and state revenues, thereby funding one of the world’s largest 
sovereign wealth funds (oljefondet).54 The sector and its supporting structures are maintained 
by powerful interests exercising an ‘ideological influence’ on society.55 However, 
petroleum’s role in supporting Norwegian human rights is insecure long-term. Physically, 
around 44 percent of total reserves have already been sold.56 Economically, Norway 
increasingly appears to suffer “Dutch disease” as petroleum increases costs for, and drains 
labour and skills from, other sectors,57 while warnings of the financial risks of investing in 
increasingly expensive and unusable carbon stocks grow.58  
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Regarding Bell’s obligations, Norway has actively promoted institutions specifying 
and allocating duties through international negotiations. However, while this partly recognises 
duties of rectification, the country has increased its contribution to climate change since 
joining the UNFCCC, especially expanding petroleum production,59 while negotiating a one 
percent emissions increase under the Kyoto Protocol, negating immediate emissions-reducing 
obligations. Duties of rectification are therefore more pressing in future climate policy.  
 
3. A human rights-based approach to climate change and existing 
Norwegian policy 
 
Meeting these duties, while simultaneously securing human rights long-term within equal 
ecological space, requires a human rights-based approach. HRBADs offer one structure-
orientated approach for this. While originally for “developing” states, HRBADs’ principles 
apply for economic development generally. While HRBADs also come in both problem-
solving and critical guises (a discussion for which there is insufficient space here), more 
structure-orientated HRBADs share critiques of hegemonic needs-based and neo-liberal 
development theories,60 using human rights standards (from the content of rights given in 
conventions, General Comments, ensuing jurisprudence and other politico-legal 
developments) to guide outcomes, and human rights principles (found in the aforementioned 
sources and underlying the implementation of all rights) to guide processes.  
 
Human rights standards 
 
Human rights standards as enunciated in the plethora of international covenants give 
development, an abstract term simply expressing ‘a normative conception of desired change’, 
a ‘legal and normative foundation… with broad-based international support’61 for ‘a political 
transformation’, challenging existing power relations.62 HRBADs begin by analysing 
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structures and actors that hinder secure rights access (as undertaken above), before identifying 
relevant international human rights standards.63  
Given climate justice narratives have stressed the importance of work and “green 
jobs”, not least because existing carbon-intensive jobs (especially in fossil fuels) will 
inevitably decline as a result of resource depletion, one relevant example of implementing a 
human rights standard while addressing climate change is the right to work, declared in the 
International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) Article 6, and an 
essential right that supports the realisation of many others (both ESCRs and CPRs). Under 
ICESCR, states must ‘take steps’, using ‘maximum … available resources’, towards 
‘achieving progressively … full realization’ of ESCRs;64 ICESCR’s expert committee’s 
General Comments, and International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions, highlight what 
full realisation entails.  
The right to work is not a right ‘to a job;’65 ICESCR ‘recognize[s],’ rather than 
guarantees, the right; however, clear emphasis on protection against unemployment and a 
‘right not to be prevented from working’66 makes work-related security a core aspect.67 
General Comment 18 specifies duties to respect the right involve not ‘denying equal access to 
decent work for all.’ Stephenson suggests this obliges ‘a comprehensive approach to social 
and economic policies that … include[s] employment opportunity and security.’ ‘Protect 
duties’ mean states must safeguard against third-party violations. ‘Fulfil duties’ require ‘a 
national policy’ for economic development that overcomes ‘unemployment and 
underemployment, in order to achieve full employment’; such a policy does not guarantee 
everyone work but aims ‘at ensuring work for all who are available and seeking’ it. Overall, 
states ‘must take a comprehensive approach towards employment policy by taking into 
account all the necessary measures to ensure the right to work, including work-related 
security’.68 This comprehensive approach is often neglected in climate-related programmes.  
Stephenson stresses that, in formal legal analysis, states might argue they comply with 
these duties if they implement a comprehensive green jobs policy that provides ‘work for all 
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people available … and willing’ because (referencing the existing research on the topic) ‘an 
equal or greater number of jobs will be created in the new green economies’. However, 
Stephenson’s critical approach recognises new jobs will be different from those lost, possibly 
located elsewhere or requiring new skills, and therefore could make some ‘unemployable in 
a… green economy’. This creation of insecurity ‘violates the right’. Thus, states must 
‘facilitate a vulnerable worker’s transition between jobs by providing employment services’.69 
ILO standards specifically apply for such a transition, including ILO Recommendation 
No.122 Article 8(b), stressing ‘selective measures directly connected with the employment of 
individual workers or categories of workers’ during transitions; Article 13(1), emphasising 
planning ‘to prevent the emergence and growth of unemployment or underemployment’; 
Article 13(3)(b), under which states must ‘protect from financial or other hardship groups and 
individuals… affected by structural changes’; and Recommendation No.169 Article 10(a), 
requiring states ‘facilitate adjustment to structural change at the global, sectoral and enterprise 
levels’ and ‘re-employment of workers who have lost their jobs as a result’. Therefore, during 
‘green structural change’, ILO standards require ‘supplementary’ and ‘specific work-related 
security measures’.70 Furthermore, green jobs must be ‘decent’ as defined by the ILO’s 
Decent Work Agenda.71 Obligations for the right to work, within the overarching right to 
ecological space and general climate-related duties, thus provide a normative framework 
against which to judge climate policies’ workers’ protection and green jobs programmes.  
Applying these considerations to Norway, it is readily apparent that human rights 
standards are absent in climate policy; there is a ‘long-term goal’ of a global ‘right to emit’72 
without elaborating on the form this would take. As noted previously, beyond its contribution 
to domestic emissions, the petroleum industry is separated from climate, and even general 
energy, policy. While there is a detailed, long-term petroleum plan, there are no coordinated 
clean energy strategies despite targets set for  energy efficiency,73 offshore renewables and 
onshore wind74. Under the approach of the previous and new government, rather than tackling 
systematic, structural and industrial obstacles to a transition and supporting green industry 
directly, carbon-intensive industries are compensated for CO2 taxes.75 This delays the 
inevitable decline of oil and gas given their non-renewable status (even if one ignores climate 
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change altogether) and, by failing to address how the country’s petroleum dependence, puts 
Norwegian human rights at risk. 
Regarding the right to work, there are no targeted workers’ protection schemes for 
petroleum’s inevitable decline, and no unified programme for green, decent jobs to replace it. 
Without a comprehensive policy for fulfilling the right to work alongside climate obligations, 
Norway risks violating the right under formal analysis (let alone Stephenson’s work-related 
security approach) – especially as the country has pushed for tougher global climate action 
that effectively accelerates petroleum’s decline. The new government’s economic policy does 
not mention green industry at all, arguably making this an even lower priority than under the 
previous government who mentioned ‘green workplaces within energy production and 
environmental technology’ as ‘a new growth industry in Norway’ in their governmental 
platform.76 Even this previous rhetorical support for green industry does not fulfil Norwegian 
climate-related human rights obligations or the right to work; it suggests that green jobs will 
grow alongside carbon-intensive industries, rather than a transition, necessary given resource 
depletion and climate change, from one to another.  
 
Human rights principles 
 
Principles guiding the application of human rights standards 
 
Various principles guide the application of human rights standards. 
Caney notes human rights ‘specify minimum moral thresholds’ for climate policy that 
people cannot fall under either directly or indirectly (through policy responses). This rejects 
consequentialism’s countenance of partial suffering to avoid higher costs for the majority as it 
does not allow temperature stabilisation goals that evidence shows will be destructive for 
anyone’s human rights. This means that the oft-proposed “two-degree limit” is indefensible 
given it implies widespread damages, including existential threats to small-island states.  
Minimum thresholds therefore provide a normative definition for ‘dangerous anthropogenic 
interference’ under the UNFCCC, namely interference that ‘systematically undermines … 
widespread’ rights enjoyment.77 Given interference well below two degrees systematically 
undermines human rights, HRBADs thereby support the fastest possible emissions reductions. 
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This conforms to the precautionary principle, and evidence of how climate feedbacks and 
‘runaway climate change’ limit the window for emissions cuts.78 Long-term reduction goals 
are nonetheless useful if accompanied by successive shorter-term targets that hold actors 
accountable in the meantime, like the UK Climate Change Act.79 Significantly, given 
emissions anywhere matter, thresholds insist states cut domestic emissions and the emissions 
they contribute to abroad. Ultimately, thresholds enhance institutional approaches’ insistence 
on immediate climate action using clear human rights standards.  
The concepts of thresholds can be further fleshed out to demonstrate the difference 
between aggregated approaches and HRBADs. Thresholds are to be prioritised in clashes 
between rights, for example where the Northern rights to development promote the 
continuation of carbon-intensive industries that threatens rights thresholds elsewhere. For  
ESCRs, ‘minimum core obligations’ have been defined, giving direct content to thresholds 
and insisting initiatives should be directed to those below thresholds first.80 Thresholds and 
the non-discrimination principle therefore justify prioritisation in economic policy based on 
historical neglect and marginalisation; these are relevant even in the North, given that there 
are citizens in those societies that are yet to have their minimum obligations fulfilled and that 
rights enjoyment must be improved even above these levels. Simultaneously, human rights’ 
indivisibility means the right to a safe environment ‘cannot be bought at the expense of’ other 
rights.’81 This relates to the non-retrogression principle, which, together with the principle of 
progressive realisation, insists mitigation programmes improve, not limit or impair, human 
rights. This approach also recognises rights’ interdependency, meaning certain crucial rights 
necessary for the enjoyment of others (such as the right to work) can be prioritised, and 
expanding development beyond economics and ESCRs to cover the totality of human 
experience (including CPRs).82 Together, these principles militate against traditional 
development trade-offs, such as allowing inequality or sacrificing CPRs in return for 
growth.83 They also suggest that leaving climate initiatives to the whims of the market, as in 
hegemonic neoliberal green economy ideas, is incompatible with a human rights-based 
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approach. Markets have winners and losers, but allowing someone to lose from the climate 
crisis contradicts these standard-setting principles, which together form the basis of what has 
been described as a new ‘green social contract’84. Indeed, the scale of the transition necessary 
to avoid catastrophic climate demands a level of intervention that research suggests markets 
simply cannot deliver alone given their inability to tackle structural constraints on capital, 
resources and labour.85  
In Norway, without a human rights-based approach stressing clear standard-setting 
principles, short-termist cost-benefit analyses dominate. Norwegian climate policy’s central 
tenet, repeated in klimameldingen, is that ‘in areas… subject to general measures, like the 
emissions trading system, further regulation will, as a general rule, be avoided’.86 Reliance on 
the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) limits more ambitious approaches, and is 
fundamentally failing. For The Economist, ETS has ‘long been a mess’. Its future is unclear 
after failure to arrest falling prices in 2013.87 A report from 40 international organisations 
finds emissions reductions in the second period were caused by the economic crisis, while 
significant investment has not been spurred and ETS has enriched private interests at public 
expense, including encouraging fraud.88 Fundamentally, focusing on carbon pricing and 
market mechanisms overlooks the transition’s structural and human rights implications, 
especially thresholds. Paradoxically, given inadequate attention to structural issues, and 
duplicated spending on carbon-intensive and carbon-reducing activities, the short-termist 
cost-benefit approach is costlier long-term. 
 Regarding target-setting, Norway lacks requirements for successive carbon budgeting 
(as in the UK Climate Change Act), meaning action on longer-term targets could be delayed. 
More fundamentally, differentiations between domestic and overseas reductions are 
incompatible with human rights approaches, as well as the Kyoto Protocol’s flexibility 
mechanisms, which must be ‘supplemental’ to domestic reductions.89 Financing overseas 
reductions has effectively been used to ‘purchase… the right to continue… emissions’ 
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domestically,90 abnegating ecological debt and duties of compensation. Making emission 
targets contingent on international agreements also ignores existing human rights 
responsibilities. Ultimately, targeting reductions overseas works from the (correct) 
observation that global, not national, emissions matter. However, while Norway is willing to 
consider global emissions when avoiding domestic cuts, it refuses to even to discuss 
petroleum exports’ global contribution.  
No central evaluation of climate-related socioeconomic threats or opportunities has 
been undertaken. The Klimakur report outlined measures to meet 2020 climate targets, but 
excluded petroleum extraction91 and employment-related consequences, emphasising 
aggregated, cost-benefit approaches.92 Failure to confront transition costs means they are 
often passed to consumers and workers, blunting positive visions of the transition. 
One example of insufficient disaggregated analysis are the aforementioned 
elsertifikater, which involve energy producers receiving “certificates” for producing 
renewables, thereafter selling them on a market as extra income. Certain suppliers must buy 
certificates, ensuring demand. Certificate costs are paid through increasing energy prices.93 
The scheme has been criticised for including hydropower projects feasible without subsidies. 
Hydropower will likely receive more support than wind. Pricing is not differentiated between 
renewable energy forms. Furthermore, consumers must pay but industry has certain 
exemptions.94 Sector actors doubt it will meet targets, while producing an energy surplus 
without planning how to use it.95  
 Given aggregated policy approaches, prioritisation towards marginal groups is 
discounted. Regarding non-retrogression and progressive realisation in particular, 
assumptions that climate initiatives will protect or enhance human rights are particularly 
dubious given lacking analysis of policies’ social effects and unwillingness to confront 
petroleum’s decline. The aforementioned klimafond could contribute to promoting the rights 
of those involved in such industries long-term by supporting industrial transformations, 
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especially as it will support ‘full-scale production lines’,96 but the Zero Emission Resource 
Organisation stresses its effectiveness depends on its structure and concrete goals,97 while the 
amount given to the fund is inefficient to tackle the scale of the transition required. More 
detail is still needed to ensure klimafond does not simply subsidise industry without 
addressing structural concerns.  
 This has been the case regarding CCS.  Fundamentally, CCS only operates at large 
emissions sources, while much global fossil fuel use occurs in transport, homes and 
businesses.98 Beyond incurring high costs for modest mitigation, CCS entrenches carbon-
intensive path dependency without developing alternatives, perpetuating deleterious human 
rights effects globally, while ignoring petroleum’s inevitable decline domestically. 
 
Principles guiding the conduct of climate-related processes 
 
HRBADs also give principles for conducting climate-related processes. Human rights-based 
participation insists on participation at all stages of socio-political processes as a right, 
making participation not just a desirable part of development, but ‘non-negotiable’.99 People 
must be given ownership of climate initiatives through decentralisation, giving initiatives 
legitimacy and sustainability. This principle provides a focal point for social movement 
mobilisation100 that is necessary for social change. Such participation is not simply 
instrumental, but normative; human rights-based participation has been described as ‘the 
organised effort to increase control over resources and regulative institutions … by those 
hitherto excluded’.101 In relation to a specifically human rights-based climate approach, this 
normative dimension requires that such participation is not undertaken for its own sake and 
does not lead to the degradation of human rights; rather, the different structural human rights 
approaches outlined above ensure that participation in a human rights-based climate policy is 
based on clear parameters defined by ecological limits and seeks to empower people to realise 
their rights through climate initiatives. Human rights, as focal points for mobilisation, can in 
particular provide a common language for labour and environmental groups with different 
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foundational traditions – a positive vision, rather than ‘sacrifice’102 narratives of ending 
carbon-intensive societies.  
In relation to Norway, workers and communities have few avenues for influencing 
priorities through exercising participatory rights, despite high public climate-related 
concern;103 most initiatives are top-down, while domination by market initiatives limits 
participatory involvement. For the government and the leading trade union confederation, 
social dialogue on the issue of climate change has been promoted without clear parameters. 
Participation beyond centralised consultation processes, especially parliamentary høringer, is 
limited. Some decentralisation occurs given local municipalities have leeway regarding local 
initiatives, but major climate initiatives remain centralised. 
Human rights-based accountability is also a key principle, making use of formal, 
informal, legal and political methods. Identifying rights and duty-holders is ‘not a neutral act’; 
it focuses on ‘deep-rooted inequalities’ for which ‘abuses are conceived as symptoms and 
structural causes of conflict’.104 Regarding climate change, HRBADs make duty-holders 
directly accountable for reducing people’s vulnerability, and make human rights standards the 
measure of progress. Human rights also extend accountability internationally. International 
assistance becomes obligatory (unlike in aid politics), drawing on ICESCR Article 2, while 
global accountability mechanisms (such as UN human rights organs) exist, and states must 
respect human rights in international negotiations.105 Climate-related human rights remedies 
must be available, but provision of compensation is not ‘permission to engage in … 
violations’ assuming one can make amends for these later;106 rather, remedies are owed to 
communities as a right.107 By linking the local with the global, human rights’ internationalism 
also protects against the special pleading sometimes witnessed in climate discourses. This is 
relevant regarding “carbon leakage”, occurring when climate policy in one country causes 
carbon-intensive industries to relocate to another (usually Southern) state with lower 
environmental standards, increasing global emissions and causing job losses in the first state. 
Given leakage, several actors, including Norwegian trade unions, argue for multilateral 
                                                 
102 Jan Davidsen; Hans O. Felix; John Leirvaag and Roy Pedersen, ‘The Climate Struggle – a Struggle for Social 
Power’ (For Velferdsstaten, 2012) <http://www.velferdsstaten.no/english/?article_id=96528> accessed 19 
September 2013 
103 Andreas Ytterstad, 100 000 klimajobber og grønne arbeidsplasser nå!: for en klimaløsning nedenfra 
(Gyldendal Akademisk 2013), 24 
104 UNDP (n 77 above) 24 
105 OHCHR (n 60 above) 8-9; 20-21 
106 Caney (n 74 above) 86-89 
107 Oxfam, Climate Wrongs and Human Rights: Putting people at the heart of climate-change policy (Executive 
Summary) (Oxfam International 2008), 11-12 
Annotated version received: 12.06.14 
agreements before transitions are unilaterally undertaken in any state.108 Given affected 
industries are ‘politically powerful’ (including where alliances between labour and capital 
exist), climate policy often includes anti-leakage compensation and exemptions for carbon-
intensive industries,109 hampering policy effectiveness. However, empirical studies suggest 
leakage has been minimal for several climate policies. Furthermore, the OECD suggests 
environmental factors ‘pale in comparison’ to economic factors in industrial relocation.110 
Thus, carbon leakage occurs, but due to competitiveness drivers, not climate policy. As Tømte 
notes, actors such as trade unions fixated on carbon leakage’s job-related effects would not 
drop demands for good wages and working conditions, which more directly trigger relocation; 
clinging to carbon leakage suggests some would rather ‘go to the bottom’ with carbon-
intensive industries than tackle climate change head-on.111 This exemplifies how problem-
solving approaches delay climate action and inevitable transitions in non-renewable 
industries, failing to secure rights enjoyment long-term. Critical human rights approaches 
provide an impetus for overcoming leakage altogether by recognising its link with 
globalisation’s ‘race to the bottom’. Human rights-based climate initiatives should therefore 
work for a ‘floor of social protection’ internationally112 to avoid carbon-intensive industries 
exploiting international differences to the detriment of climate (not to mention social) goals. 
At the same time, social movement alliances should be sought across borders to agitate for 
more ambitious approaches to climate change.   
Lacking legislation making climate targets an ‘absolute requirement’ in decision-
making,113 responsibility for Norway’s target-related duties is unclear, making it difficult to 
hold successive governments accountable for distant targets. Departments that ‘do not have 
climate targets as their primary mandate’ often reject sustainable choices if these contradict 
‘sector targets’.114 Regarding international accountability, Norway maintains a high-profile in 
climate negotiations, pushing for binding agreements.115 Development policy promotes 
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climate initiatives, while klimamelding considered increasing climate-related forestry funding 
in the South if other countries reciprocated.116 There have, however, been difficulties using 
these funds,117 while oljefondet has undermined this by investing in logging,118 not to mention 
part-state owned Statoil’s foreign tar sands investments.119 Ultimately, Norway’s position in 
international negotiations is increasingly undermined by petroleum commitments. Elsewhere, 
an ultimately self-defeating conception of carbon leakage dominates, defending short-term 
interests rather than confronting long-term threats. Regardless, leakage is not relevant to 
petroleum; leaving one state’s fossil fuel resources alone ensures a share of global carbon 
reserves remains untouched.  
 
4. Conclusion: towards a human rights-based approach to climate change 
in Norway 
 
A human rights-based approach depends on the strength of social movements and 
participatory processes in giving people ownership over the transition to a green economy. 
Specific outcomes of these iterative processes, which must take into account local conceptions 
of human rights, cannot be outlined in detail in advance. However, certain parameters can be 
set for the way forward.  
Enshrining a human rights-based approach in law could underpin social movement 
demands. Suggestions have been already made about enacting a general climate law, like the 
UK Climate Change Act, which is ‘independent of economic analysis’ and ‘set with… 
prioritised societal aims in mind’.120 The British law has provided a reference for social 
movements in defeating airport expansion.121 However, the Act overlooks human rights; its 
carbon budgeting does not mandate evaluating social impacts. Instead, movements can 
demand a human rights-based climate law that explicitly establishes the link between 
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ecological space and limits with human rights; outlines clear climate-related duties; and 
ensures that the aforementioned human rights standards and principles apply to all areas of 
politics.  
The law would require at least 85 percent domestic emissions reductions from 1990 
levels by 2050 through successive carbon budgets, with ecological debt requiring further 
supplementary mitigation elsewhere. This has certain implications. As is routinely mooted,122 
Norway has the potential to become an exporter of renewable energy. However, as Fivh 
suggest, Norway should not be credited for overseas emissions reductions from renewables 
export,123 especially given ecological debt. Furthermore, the question is whether such export 
would be possible within sustainable ecological space (given the large infrastructure required 
over land and sea), and whether it precludes local production and green jobs elsewhere. A 
holistic approach must be taken of any potential developments and their global effects on 
interconnected ecosystems and socioeconomic processes. In principle, exporting renewables 
should assist others’ transitions, prioritising countries incapable of self-sufficiency. 
Hydropower can also balance fluctuating supply in wind-generating states.124  
Similarly, Norway must address overseas emissions from consumption. A problem-
solving approach is putting an amount equal to the cost of Norway’s overseas carbon footprint 
into a fund for climate development initiatives to be invested in the South.125 However, from a 
more critical perspective, reconsideration of a world-system based on trading goods that can 
be produced locally is required. Fundamental consumption changes are necessary to reduce 
ecological footprints. However, rather than simply reducing consumers’ purchasing power (as 
Fivh propose),126 human rights-based climate approaches should seek positive alternatives to 
mass consumption. Localisation is key, stressing production for need based on local priorities 
of long-lasting goods with full life-cycle considerations. Social movements can play a role in 
protecting commons and building local projects, from energy cooperatives to local food 
networks. This ‘prefigurative politics’127 provides direct participatory experience of 
sustainable lifestyles, cultivates counter-hegemonic constituencies of support, directly fulfils 
human rights, and demonstrates the often-abstract vision of a low-carbon future. 
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A human rights-based climate law would require a transition from petroleum to green 
industries, securing the right to work while realigning society with sustainable ecological 
space. This is the “most important individual measure Norway can take.”128 Fivh suggest a 
transition through stopping exploration and new developments in existing fields by redeeming 
extraction permits where developments are yet to begin (returning Statoil to full state 
ownership and waiving its permits would assist this); closing existing fields by buying-out 
private interests; and limiting production to long-term gas contracts.129 Gas production would 
remain over 80bn sm³ oil equivalent  in 2020 (compared to 100bn today)130 given around 80 
percent is tied to 10-20 year contracts; thus, gas production would not cease until 2030. Oil is 
not so contractually-constrained.131 As state enterprise Petero and Statoil (70 percent state-
owned) control around 70 percent of the continental shelf, and assuming share prices from 
March 2012, Fivh estimated costs of buying-up Statoil at NOK 147bn, with other companies’ 
property on the shelf valuing NOK 300-400bn (which could be bought out by exchanging 
holdings on the continental shelf with Statoil’s international holdings). Thus, a maximum 
NOK 400-500bn (around one tenth of oljefondet) would be needed; indeed, many contracts 
will end regardless before 2020 (and many more before 2030).132 Furthermore, as sole owner, 
the state would receive all gas-related income (NOK 1.7 trillion by 2020 even after production 
decreases).133 This plan would mean around 16 percent of potential emissions from burning 
remaining reserves would still be released – over 50 times current domestic emissions. Going 
further requires breaking contracts.134 Fivh suggests the government assists importers to 
replace gas with Norwegian renewables; oljefondet could also invest in renewables in those 
countries. Reducing oil exports will also likely reduce emissions significantly elsewhere by 
increasing oil prices.135  
Anticipating this transition’s employment effects is crucial. In order to fulfil the right 
to work, workers require targeted protection programmes, with retraining, income support 
while finding new jobs, and relocation assistance. However, there are good reasons for 
assuming costs will be kept to a minimum. Norway is said to have ‘world class’ technical and 
                                                 
128 Hille (n 19 above) 8  
129 Ibid. 
130 Hille (n 3 above) 72-73 
131 Ibid. 26 
132 Ibid. 21  
133 Ibid. 66 
134 Hille (n 19 above) 4-6 
135 Hille (n 3 above) 61-62 
Annotated version received: 12.06.14 
research competencies in offshore technologies relevant to renewables.136 Sintef137 suggest 
100,000 offshore petroleum jobs can be directly transferred to offshore wind. Furthermore, 
likelihood of relocation is low as there is significant potential for renewable energy in 
petroleum-dependent regions off the south-west coast where 68 per cent of those directly-
employed in petroleum are based.138 Developing a quarter of the potential outlined in a 2007 
offshore wind study would create up to 60,000 jobs, largely in the areas currently dominated 
by petroleum,139 while 50,000 sustainable transport jobs (in public transport, shifting goods 
transport from road to rail, and replacing fossil fuel-powered vehicles) could also be created 
over the next 20 years.140 Meanwhile, energy efficiency potential is high, and efficiency 
measures are highly labour-intensive,141 while freeing capacity for energy-intensive 
industries. Ultimately, a human rights-based just transition aims to avoid having to resort to 
reactive protection programmes by creating green jobs and anticipating skills-gaps in 
advance.  
Petroleum’s industrial development is instructive for green industries. Norway’s 
petroleum industry is described as ‘the classic example’ of building-up specialist 
knowledge142 as required for green technologies. The strategic role of the state in controlling 
petroleum concessions, mandating that foreign companies work in partnership with 
Norwegian suppliers and research communities, and generating revenue through windfall 
taxes143 has delivered spill-over effects that ensure Norway has managed petroleum to 
promote national welfare. Similar approaches could apply to green industries. One state-
owned enterprise could, like Statoil for petroleum, drive green industrial development. Statoil 
could do this again, especially if returned to state control, which would also facilitate 
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workers’ transitions. Crucially, green industries will not start entirely from scratch. Pöyry 
estimated ‘classic’ green industries represented 4 percent of GNP in 2008, employing 89,000 
(mostly in sustainable transport).144 The solar industry is already ‘a global player’ thanks to 
knowledge from the process industry for new petroleum fields and ‘the same national R&D 
institutes’ that helped develop aluminium.145 Petroleum developed as it did because state, 
capital and labour pulled in the same direction; the crucial process is entangling these social 
relations and pointing them in a new one. Critically, duties of rectification and ecological debt 
insist Norway use part of the wealth it has accrued through not respecting others’ human 
rights to redress these wrongs (largely in the South). Oljefondet – a near-literal manifestation 
of ecological debt – was designed to ensure future generations share in petroleum wealth. 
There is no better way to do this, or repay ecological debt, than by using oljefondet to 
reorganise society and support green industries, ensuring sustainable human rights enjoyment. 
 Ultimately, a human rights-based approach will be won in struggle by social 
movements. Social movement progression often involves small, successive gains, rather than 
full-scale agenda implementation – in Gramscian terms, more a “war of position” (a “cultural 
and informational modality of social transformation”) than “war of manoeuvre’.146 The 
challenge is ensuring different actors maintain common goals without being side-tracked into 
narrower campaigns. First steps could see climate justice proponents unite formally and 
prioritise mobilising those affected by the transitions, especially petroleum-dependent 
workers and communities. This has already happened through Klimavalg 2013 – featuring 
several unions, environmental organisations and the Norwegian church – which is continuing 
after its initial focus on the election. It has been argued here that, together, structural human 
rights approaches pull climate discourses in a more critical direction that provides a 
framework for analysis and basis for action by these social movements for ensuring a human 
rights-based transition to a green economy that is both just and effective. Climate justice 
narratives have highlighted the necessity of social and industrial change for tackling the 
climate crisis, and the role of work, workers and social movements. Structure-orientated 
human rights approaches give these discourses a clearer, broader human rights-based 
definition of justice and a green economy, in addition to international standards and 
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principles. Through this, human rights can become catalysts for stuttering climate policy, and 
reassert their claim to be the principal language of justice.  
